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Abstract This article briefly reviews the causes and impacts 
of the massive eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami of 
11 March 2011, and comments on the response measures 
taken by Japan to cope with this devastating disaster. Mass 
losses occurred mostly because the intensity of the quake 
and the induced tsunami exceeded local coping capacity. 
Particularly, the nuclear power plant crisis triggered by the 
tsunami significantly increased the short- and long-term 
impacts of the disaster. While the coping capacity Japanese 
society built after the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji great earthquake 
tremendously mitigated the damages, there is room for 
improvement despite Japan’s great efforts in this disaster. 
Investigating the tsunami preparedness of the coastal nuclear 
power plants is an issue of paramount importance. In response 
to future large-scale disasters, there is an urgent need for a 
highly collaborative framework based on which all available 
resources could be mobilized; a mutual assistance and rescue 
system against catastrophes among regions and countries 
on the basis of international humanitarian aid; and further 
in-depth research on the multi-hazard and disaster-chain 
phenomenon in large-scale disasters and corresponding 
governance approaches.
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1 Introduction
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred in 
the international waters of the western Pacific and induced a 
huge tsunami. These natural disasters hit the northeastern part 
of Japan and caused heavy casualties, enormous property 
losses, and a severe nuclear crisis with regional and global 
long-term impact. On April 1, the Japanese government 
officially named the disaster “The 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami” (東日本大震災, Higashi Nihon Daishinsai, 
literally “Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster”).
2 Characteristics of the 2011 Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami
The main earthquake disaster hit Japan at 14:46 Tokyo time 
on 11 March 2011. The epicenter was estimated at 38.322°N 
and 142.369°E (Figure 1), merely 77 km (47.9 miles) off 
the eastern coast of Japan’s Honshu island, 129 km from 
Sendai, 177 km from Fukushima, and 373 km from Tokyo. 
The hypocenter was at an underwater depth of 32 km 
(19.9 miles). 
According to the Japan Meteorological Agency (2011), the 
magnitude estimate of this quake was initially 7.9, then 
revised to 8.4, 8.8, 8.9, back to 8.8, and finally set at 9.0. The 
data released by the United States Geological Survey was 8.8, 
but revised to 8.9 the same day. On March 14, it was finally 
set at 9.0. This 9.0 magnitude earthquake is the third highest 
ever recorded in the world, after the 9.5 magnitude quake that 
hit Chile in1960 and the 9.2 magnitude quake that hit Alaska 
in 1964. 
Figure 1. Epicenter of the 2011 Great Earthquake in Japan 
Tokai and the hypocentral regions classified by the Earth-
quake Survey Committee, Japan
Source: Earthquake Survey Committee, Japan 2011.
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A number of foreshocks and aftershocks occurred before 
and after the main quake. Several thousand quakes were 
recorded by April 11. Relatively severe foreshocks and 
aftershocks included a magnitude 7.2 foreshock on March 9, 
and magnitude 7.0, 7.4, and 7.2 aftershocks at 15:06 Japan 
Standard Time (JST), 15:15 JST, and 15:26 JST on March 11. 
On April 7 and 11, magnitude 7.4 (revised to 7.1) and 7.1 
aftershocks occurred. 
The main quake triggered a massive, destructive tsunami 
(Figure 2). It reached the eastern coast of Honshu, Japan 
within a couple of minutes after the quake, and spilled into the 
interior to a maximum distance of 10 km. It was estimated 
that the tsunami wave was up to 38 m high (Kyodo News 
2011), while field observation suggested that the record was 
24 m, according to the figure released by the Port and Airport 
Research Institute (2011) on March 23. Based on the analysis 
of the Japan Meteorological Research Institute (JMRI 2011), 
the wave source zone of the tsunami covered about 550 km 
from north to south and about 200 km from east to west, 
setting a record for the most extensive wave source zone 
around the Japan Sea. 
The tsunami caused by the quake affected almost the whole 
Pacific coast, and over 20 countries on both sides of the 
Pacific issued tsunami warnings, including Japan, Russia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Chile, and the United States.
The quake released surface energy of 1.9  ±  0.5  ×  1017J 
(USGS Earthquake Hazards Program 2011a), two times that 
of the Indonesia tsunami in 2004. The total energy released, 
including shaking and the tsunami, amounted to 3.9  ×  1022J 
(USGS Earthquake Hazards Program 2011b), slightly lower 
than that of the Indonesia tsunami, equivalent to 9.32  ×  1012 t 
of TNT or about 600 million times that of the Hiroshima atom 
bomb.
Analysis of the USGS (USGS Earthquake Hazards 
Program 2011b) showed that this earthquake was triggered 
as the Pacific Plate slipped beneath Japan, while moving 
towards the Eurasian Plate to the west. Before this disaster, 
the Pacific Plate moved a few centimeters west away from the 
North American Plate every year, which led to this large 
earthquake as plate movement released energy. 
The March 11 earthquake was induced by at least four dif-
ferent hypocenters slipping in a short period (see Figure 1). 
Based on the aftershock records, these hypocenters 
include not only Sanriku-Oki and Miyagiken-Oki, the two 
hypocenters considered most likely to have slipped, but also 
Fukushimaken-Oki and Ibaragiken-Oki. Such large-scale, 
interrelated earthquakes had not been envisioned by many 
earthquake experts.
3 Impacts of the 2011 Eastern Japan 
Great Earthquake Disaster
3.1 Geophysical Impact
The violent shock resulting from the seismic intensity moved 
the Honshu island of Japan about 3.6 m to the east, shifted the 
earth’s axis by 25 cm, and accelerated the planet’s rotation 
by 1.8 microseconds (Chai 2011; CBS News 2011). A total 
of 400 km of Japan’s east coast has subsided about 0.6 m 
because of the quake (Chang 2011). Ojika-hantou of 
Miyagi-ken, located northwest of the epicenter, has moved 
about 5.3 m southeast towards the epicenter, with a simulta-
neous subsidence of about 1.2 m. The World Meteorological 
Organization has warned the Japanese government of poten-
tially more severe flood risk in the northeastern part of Japan 
in the future (Xinhuanet 2011).
Figure 2. Tsunami caused by the 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake 
Source: NOAA 2011.
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3.2 Humanitarian Impact 
The influence exerted by the seismic event itself was not so 
striking. Only one prefecture was impacted with a seismic 
intensity of VII, and eight prefectures were impacted with a 
seismic intensity greater than VI (Figure 3). But the losses 
incurred by the earthquake and tsunami together were 
extremely severe. According to statistical data from the Japan 
National Police Agency (Table 1), by April 13, there were in 
total 13,392 people dead nationwide and 15,133 missing. 
More than 335,000 refugees in northeast Japan are lacking in 
food, water, shelters, medical care, and even the necessary 
means to conduct funerals for the deceased.i
3.3 Impact on Buildings
Up to April 3, there were 190,000 buildings damaged, among 
which 45,700 were totally destroyed. The damaged buildings 
in Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima were 29,500, 12,500, 
and 2400, respectively (NHK World 2011). By April 13, the 
number was further verified by the Japan Police Agency 
and increased (Table 1). About 250 million tons of rubble and 
debris were produced in Japan because of the earthquake and 
tsunami disaster. 
3.4 Impact on Key Infrastructures
Several nuclear power plants and thermal power plants were 
heavily damaged in this disaster and details will be elaborated 
later in this article. The power supply of the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) was reduced by 21 GW, causing 
outages for 4.4 million families in eastern Japan (Japan 
Times 2011; The Nikkei 2011). From March 14 to March 29, 
TEPCO implemented rolling blackouts in most areas of 
Tokyo. Meanwhile, with the support of Tokyo residents’ 
power-saving activities and temporary supply from steel 
manufacturers’ power plants, rolling blackouts are expected 
to be avoided throughout this summer (Japan Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry 2011).
The quake severely affected Japan’s transportation system. 
After the quake, all ports in Japan were closed for a short 
time, and the 15 ports impacted by the disaster were not 
fully reopened until March 29 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2011). 
Because of the quake, the northeastern part of the Tokaido 
Shinkansen high-speed rail line was shut down and not 
reopened to the public until March 24 (The Guardian 2011). 
Sixty-two of the 70 railway lines run by the East Japan 
Railway were affected to various degrees, and 23 railway 
stations and seven lines were completely destroyed (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun 2011). The Sendai airport incurred massive 
losses because it was attacked by the flood caused by the 
tsunami one hour after the quake. Both Tokyo’s Narita and 
Haneda airports were closed for about 24 hours (The Aviation 
Herald 2011).
3.5 Economic Impact
It is estimated that 23,600 hectares of farmland were ruined 
and 3–4 percent of the rice production in Japan was affected 
in this great earthquake and tsunami disaster (Martin 2011). 
Many large-scale manufacturers of automobiles (for example, 
Toyota, Nissan, and Honda), steel (for example, Nippon 
Steel), and chemicals (for example, Mitsubishi Kagagu) were 
off production (Mainichi Daily News 2011), causing a 
decline in global automobile production. 
The Japan earthquake led to significant fluctuations in the 
global financial markets. On the day of the earthquake, March 
11, the Nikkei Stock Average dropped 5 percent (Reuters 
2011), and it dropped another 1000 points (10.6 percent) 
on March 15, when the seriousness of the nuclear accident 
became clear (CNBC 2011). Subject to the earthquake, 
Germany’s DAX index and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index 
also decreased in varying degrees. But the main American 
stocks experienced a slight increase of 0.5 to 0.7 percent. The 
world’s largest reinsurers, Munich Re and Swiss Re were 
speculated to suffer total reinsurance losses of 10 billion U.S. 
dollars (Kucera 2011) even after the losses absorbed by 
primary insurers and grants from the Japanese government.
The earthquake brought about the rapid appreciation of the 
Japanese yen, and the yen against the U.S. dollar at one point 
reached 76.25 yen to 1 U.S. dollar, the highest point since 
World War II (BBC 2011). Appreciation of the yen is harmful 
to the Japanese economy, which is heavily dependent on 
exports.
The Industrial Production Index dramatically decreased by 
15.5 percent compared to the index in February (Table 2). Not 
Figure 3. Estimated seismic intensity from observation 
stations right after 14:46 on 11 March 2011
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency 2011.
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Table 2. March 2011 Japan Industrial Production Index (100 in year 2005)
Item
Seasonally Adjusted Index Original Index
Index Changes from February (%) Index Changes from February (%)
Production† 82.7 -15.5 88.7 -13.1
Shipping‡ 85.0 -14.6 95.0 -12.1
Source: Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2011 (Confirmed version reported on May 19).
†: Weighted average of the amount of major items (521 items) produced by the industrial sector. Weight of each item is determined by the added value for each 
item with respect to the reference year (2005).
‡: Production items shipped from factories, a measurement for actual transaction of goods. 
Table 1. Damage from the 2011 Eastern Japan Great Earthquake and Tsunami (as of April 13)















Hokkaido 1  3        
Northeast Aomori 3 1 61 272 970 6   2  
Iwate 3867 4101 154 18,742 1024  30  4
Miyagi 8190 8025 3055 36,772 3452  1006 23
Akita   12      9  
Yamagata 2  29 37 80    21  
Fukushima 1272 3003 240 2417 959    
Tokyo 7  77 3 6  3  16  1
Kanto Ibaraki 23 1 691 711 3453  307 41
Tochigi 4  135 146 1142    257  
Gunma 1  35  1    7  
Saitama   42  5  1 1 160  
Chiba 18 2 223 706 1636  3 3 321  
Kanagava 4  128        
Niigata   3        
Yamanashi   2        
Shizuoka   4        
Central Gifu         1  
Mie   1        
Shikoku Tokushima           
Kochi   1        
Total 13,392 15,133 4896 59,806 12,728 6 7 4 2137 69
Source: Japan National Police Agency 2011 (excerpt from original table).
only the damaged area, but also the non-damaged areas were 
suffering from scarcity of materials, and final demand 
decreases. Because many industries in the upper streams 
of the supply chains were located in Tohoku, the northeast 
region of Honshu, and the northeast areas of the Kanto region 
around greater Tokyo, their damages caused widely spreading 
economic impacts, which were unforeseen by many crisis 
managers.
According to an early evaluation by analysts, the earth-
quake disaster caused direct economic losses of about 171–
183 billion USD, while the significant cost for recovery might 
reach 122 billion USD (Pagano 2011). On June 24, the Prime 
Minister’s office crisis management center announced a rough 
estimation of over 16 trillion yen for property damages alone 
(Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2011). This estimation 
is based on the damage ratio of buildings of the 1995 
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. In the best case scenario (16 
trillion yen), the total property damages are 14 trillion yen in 
three prefectures in the Tohoku region alone. This amounts to 
about 20 percent of the total economic value of property in 
these three areas.
4 The Nuclear Power Plant Crisis
The earthquake and tsunami created a serious nuclear crisis. 
Affected by the quake, the 11 nuclear power plants in north-
east Japan, including the first and second nuclear power plants 
in Fukushima, and the nuclear power plants in Onagawa, 
Genshiryoku, and Hatsudensho, automatically stopped oper-
ating their nuclear reactors. However, the cooling system of 
the first nuclear power plant in Fukushima also stopped work-
ing because of the impact of the tsunami, causing the reactor 
temperature to rise. Although the Japanese government and 
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the operator Tokyo Electric Power Company adopted a series 
of measures, the nuclear accident gradually became a level 7 
nuclear event, which is a major accident and the highest level 
on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES), equivalent to the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986. 
The radiation in the vicinity of the reactor rose steeply, 
becoming a deadly threat to the local residents, as well as 
polluting vegetables, milk, and water. TEPCO also released 
tens of thousands of tons of low radiation nuclear pollution 
water into the Pacific, resulting in grave concern and criticism 
from neighboring countries. 
The way that the nuclear incidents were triggered is plant-
specific. However, the most catastrophic consequences have 
arisen from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, where three 
units were exposed to level 7 accidents and one unit was 
exposed to a level 3 incident. The critical issue in the crisis 
became the cooling systems failures. 
The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant mainly uses 
reactors to boil water, lets the steam drive steam engines, and 
returns the cooled water to the reactors to cool them down. In 
the system, water immerses the fuel rods and cycles in the 
system with radioactive isotopes. Under normal conditions 
this is not a problem because the process occurs in a closed 
cycle. None of the water, steam, and radioactive isotopes can 
escape from the closed vessel. 
The earthquake and subsequent tsunami broke the closed 
cycle and delivered a deadly strike against the cooling system 
(Figure 4). The cooling system was designed to be supported 
with four different power supplies. The offsite power supply 
from the power grid and the internal power supply from the 
reactor were down because of the earthquake. The on-site fuel 
generator started working once the other two power sources 
failed, but was damaged by the tsunami wave. Emergency 
back-up batteries appeared to be affected by the tsunami as 
well, but could at most have lasted for eight hours even if they 
had been spared from damage. As a result, the cooling system 
stopped working and this triggered the set of extremely 
severe consequences.
Due to the nature of the nuclear fuel used in the plant, the 
core temperature of the reactors dropped only very slowly 
after the cooling system was down because there was still 
slow decay even after the reactors had gone off-line. The high 
temperature turned most of the internal coolant water into 
steam, which in turn exposed the fuel rods to air. Without the 
provision of a cooling alternative, the high temperature would 
have melted down the nuclear fuel rods. Fuel would escape 
away from control rods, intensify decay, melt through the 
reactor floor, and consequently induce a massive release of 
radioactive isotopes, a worst case scenario. 
In order to avoid the most catastrophic consequences, 
operators of the plant tried to inject coolant water from 
external sources (first seawater, later freshwater). The injecte d 
external coolant water, however, was then turned into steam 
and further increased the vessel pressure, which hampered 
water injection. As a result, operators had to bleed-off pres-
sure, which resulted in hydrogen explosions and the release 
of radioactive isotopes from the vessel. Radioactive isotopes 
released from Fukushima were later detected in North 
America and other regions in the world. Coolant water that 
did not escape the vessel in the form of steam accumulated in 
the bottom of the reactors in highly radioactive form. These 
waters either leaked or were released by the operator into 
the Pacific Ocean. Widespread radioactive pollution was 
created. Worse yet, though countermeasures were adopted, 
the fuel rods in units 1, 2, and 3 of the plant were reported to 
have experienced major damage and possibly fully melted 
(TEPCO 2011a, 2011b; CNN 2011). The long-term impact of 
the nuclear crisis to Japan, the Asia-Pacific region, and the 
entire world is still not fully revealed. 
Figure 4. Illustrative chart of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis
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5 National and International Response
5.1 Response of Japan
After the earthquake, a countermeasure office was immedi-
ately set up in the Prime Minister’s office crisis management 
center. The Japanese government established a special head-
quarters for emergent disasters headed by Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan. At the press conference on April 13, the Prime 
Minister declared that it was the most serious disaster in 
Japan after World War II. The other main response head-
quarters, also lead by the Prime Minister, was set up for the 
nuclear crisis. These two headquarters became the main 
decision-making bodies on crisis management. 
The Japanese government also established a government 
emergency response headquarters headed by Foreign 
Minister Matsumoto. He said that Tokyo welcomes foreign 
countries to provide any assistance to Japan, and Japanese 
government would check foreigners in Japan and confirm 
security situation of the embassies in Tokyo.
The Japanese government also established a countermea-
sure headquarters against disasters headed by the Defense 
Minister, Toshimi Kitazawa. On April 13, the Japanese Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan asked the Ministry of Defense to send out 
100,000 self-defense officers to participate in rescue work. 
The total number of troops mobilized, including those provid-
ing logistics, was 180,000, the largest number dispatched by 
the Japan Self-Defense Forces since World War II.
On April 14, the Bank of Japan (the Central Bank) held 
a monetary policy meeting, discussing the new monetary 
easing policy to be implemented after the Eastern Japan Great 
Earthquake Disaster. On March 14, 15, 17, and 22, the Bank 
of Japan successively injected capital of up to 4 trillion yen in 
cash into the market (Wearden 2011).
5.2 International Involvement
After the quake, Japan specifically requested quake rescue 
teams from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States (Nebehay 2011). It also 
requested satellite images of available types of the quake and 
tsunami regions according to the International Charter on 
Space and Major Disasters.
By March 30, 134 countries and regions and 39 interna-
tional organizations had expressed their willingness to 
provide aid to Japan (Figure 5). Twenty-three countries 
and regions sent out rescue teams and experts on nuclear 
accidents. The statistical data released by the Narita branch 
of Tokyo Customs on March 29 showed that, in total, 190 
batches and 1300 tons of relief goods from 29 countries and 
regions arrived at Narita Airport between March 12 and 25. 
Of these 190 batches, 60 were from China, 40 from the 
United States, 30 from Thailand, and 20 from Korea. The 
major types of goods included food, blankets, mineral water, 
radiation protection suits, and emergency lamps. By April 3 
the Japanese Red Cross had received over one billion USD in 
donations in response to the disaster, and dispatched more 
than 200 emergency relief teams to the disaster zone. 
The earthquake-tsunami induced nuclear crisis has been 
of grave concern. Many countries started to evacuate their 
citizens from the northern part of Japan right after the disaster. 
UN agencies were widely involved in the nuclear issue, 
including the World Health Organization (WHO), the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO), the World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
The WHO together with the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) conducts inspections and provides information 
on (sea)food safety after the nuclear accident. The IAEA 
Briefing on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident is updated on a 
daily basis since the quake (IAEA 2011). Tourists and other 
visitors to Japan are advised by the IMO, ICAO, UNWTO, 
and Japanese government agencies on travel and transport 
from and to Japan by air or sea.
Figure 5. Countries and regions expressed willingness to provide aid to Japan after the 2011 Earthquake disaster
Source: Wikipedia 2011. 
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6 Comments and Discussion
6.1 Prepared for the Expected
After the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995, the Japanese 
government and society profoundly reflected on the precau-
tions that needed to be taken against earthquake disasters. 
Many new measures became the solid foundation for Japan to 
cope with this most recent earthquake-tsunami catastrophe to 
some degree. 
For example, Japan attaches great importance to scientific 
research and technological development on disaster preven-
tion and mitigation. The Japan Meteorological Agency oper-
ates the world’s first earthquake early warning system, which 
can warn the Japanese people ahead of a quake. It also can 
detect seismic waves near the epicenter, and send out early 
warnings through national television and radio networks, 
even through mobile phones. On the day of the main quake, 
alarm was sounded around 80 seconds before the beginning 
of shaking in Tokyo area.
In Japan there are various ways for the public to get access 
to disaster information—by mass media and cell phone 
services, for example. The Japanese media have developed a 
rapid and systematic reporting system for disaster situations, 
and will promptly disclose all kinds of useful information 
whenever a natural disaster occurs. Japan also invests heavily 
in public disaster education, making one of the highest disas-
ter risk aware populations in the world. With the help of 
disaster preparedness training carried out in communities, 
the Japanese people have developed the skills and habits of 
self-relief.
The Self-Defense Troops are granted much power by the 
government in response to disasters. This is a significant gain 
from the experience of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. In 
response to the Eastern Japan Great Earthquake Disaster, 
the Self-Defense Troops played an indispensible role in orga-
nizing emergency response actions and accomplished many 
in-field missions. All of these preparations constituted a solid 
foundation for the Japanese to raise evacuation rates during 
the tsunami disaster and reduce the loss of lives.
Japan is also implementing one of the most stringent con-
struction standards in the world, with intensively reinforced 
residential buildings, bridges, and other infrastructures. It is 
worth noting that Japan is a leader in earthquake proofing 
nuclear plants, although a severe nuclear crisis was induced 
by the earthquake-triggered tsunami. All nuclear reactors 
automatically stopped operating after the quake. The building 
damages and the nuclear plant crisis were induced by the 
tsunami rather than the quake per se. 
6.2 Prepared Beyond the Expected: Where to Go from 
Here
The 2011 earthquake-tsunami was so severe that it went 
far beyond the expectation and coping capacity of Japanese 
society. The quake was of high magnitude and the energy 
released was huge. The tsunami triggered by the earthquake 
critically overwhelmed the coping capacity of the stricken 
areas. Preparedness is based on expectation and prediction, 
which had not taken into account the extreme situation that 
actually unfolded. From that standpoint Japan is not prepared 
enough. 
First, the disaster impact easily overwhelmed local coping 
capacity. Although local evacuation centers and public build-
ings were available for the local people, there were cases in 
which many old people died because they were not able to 
evacuate quickly. In the field survey conducted by the 
authors, some concrete buildings stood after the tsunami 
disaster, which potentially could have become emergent 
evacuation shelters if they had been reinforced/upgraded. 
Although disaster evacuation drills were held regularly 
in many local communities, they were not helpful to all 
segments of the population because the evacuation centers 
were not easily accessible for many old people and it was dif-
ficult for them to be really involved in these drills. Emergency 
evacuation plans and drills require further improvement. 
Second, Japan is not prepared for a truly “mega” disaster. 
Experiences in other countries have shown that a large-scale 
disaster cannot be coped with solely by local capacities and 
aid from outside of the stricken region is indispensible. In 
this earthquake disaster, the damaged/affected areas were 
so extensive that clusters of local governments for cities and 
prefectures were paralyzed. Not only the public sectors, but 
also many private sectors were unable to provide adequate 
services during this disaster due to damaged infrastructures. 
These services include providing energy, food and water, and 
medical treatment. A typical example of these difficulties is 
the power frequency difference between East Japan and West 
Japan. In Kansai area the frequency of electricity is 60 Hz, 
while in Kanton area it is 50 Hz. Though there are two 
stations able to covert frequency, the capacity is limited to 
1 GW, far below the drop due to power plant failure. 
Third, Japan’s response system is not as efficient as it 
could be. A valuable lesson drawn from the Chinese experi-
ence in dealing with the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 (Shi 
et al. 2009) is the significance of centralized power in coping 
with large-scale disasters. In this earthquake-tsunami disaster, 
the Japanese government appeared not as powerful as had 
been expected in resolving many issues, particularly with 
respect to the nuclear crisis. Coordination between the 
government (emergency response headquarters), the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, and the nuclear and industrial 
safety agency were not sufficiently organized. Information 
was not simultaneously shared right after the disaster, which 
delayed efficient decision making.
Finally, Japan, as well as probably all nuclear countries in 
the world, is not truly prepared for nuclear crises. Although 
there were two types of back-up power supply available in the 
Fukushima nuclear power plant, they simply failed because 
they were as vulnerable as the major power supply systems. 
“Backup” did not make sense in this case. Obviously, a major 
tsunami was not in the plan of the designer and operator of the 
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plant. This is a serious mistake because these plants are 
located exactly in the coastal and earthquake-prone region of 
the country. 
6.3 Prepared for Unexpected Large-Scale Disasters
Several issues regarding the governance of large-scale 
disaster risk arise from the experience of the Eastern Japan 
Great Earthquake Disaster.
(1) The severity and unexpectedness of large-scale disas-
ters require a global, synergic, and efficient response system. 
The response needs to mobilize all available resources, from 
public and private sectors, affected and unaffected areas, 
domestic and abroad. The response needs to highly coordi-
nate all disaster response entities so that the synergic effect is 
achieved. The response must be founded on rational strategies 
with orderly and efficient arrangements based on the 
emergency plans. In this sense, centralized power in the face 
of large-scale disasters is indispensible.
(2) The regionalized and globalized impacts of large-scale 
disasters call for a new international platform to cope jointly. 
The recent experiences of catastrophes worldwide imply that 
the impact of a catastrophe is no longer confined to the 
affected areas but spreads around the world in the context of 
globalization. The mismanagement of the affected countries 
will bring about serious consequences for the surrounding 
countries or even the whole world. 
The radioactive contamination caused by the nuclear 
accident following the earthquake and tsunami is affecting 
the rest of the world through atmospheric circulation. The 
polluted water released by the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company is likely to affect the entire Pacific Ocean in the 
coming decades. In the long term, impacts of radiation should 
be carefully monitored and assessed based on data derived 
from previous nuclear accidents and state-of-the-art medical 
knowledge. International frameworks are required to do so.
The Japanese economic instability caused by the quake 
affects the yen and Japan’s domestic economy, which draws 
attention from the G7 (Group of Seven) that is already plan-
ning to intervene against the yen when necessary. Moreover, 
the existing international framework of humanitarian aid 
cannot meet the demand of coping with large-scale disasters. 
A mutual assistance system that incorporates a higher degree 
of international involvement in coping with large-scale 
disasters should be established.
(3) The complexity of the catastrophic impact urges us to 
conduct further studies on multi-hazard and disaster-chain 
issues. Due to the super-energy released in the catastrophe, 
many regional physical-geographical factors are likely to 
cross critical thresholds of balance and create secondary 
hazards, which will transmit and enlarge the disaster in the 
form of disaster chains to an extent beyond regional endur-
ance. In the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China, for exam-
ple, the quake generated a huge amount of loose soil and 
rocks, inducing landslides and debris flow. In the Eastern 
Japan Great Earthquake Disaster, what mattered most was not 
the quake but the tsunami as well as the nuclear crisis that it 
triggered. The chained-triggering phenomenon is similar to 
other catastrophes in recent years. It is also a critical reason 
that large-scale disasters generally claimed huge losses. 
Therefore, it is necessary to study the formation mechanism 
of disaster chains and issue region-specific precautions 
against potential disaster chains.
(4) Key infrastructures require more robust systems 
planning and design. Here key infrastructures refer to those 
that can largely facilitate disaster relief efforts, for example, 
life-line projects and transportation hubs, or those that create 
serious threats, such as nuclear power plants and major water 
dams. Failure of a key infrastructure would lead to the failure 
of an entire system. In most cases problems only need to 
occur in one or several small but critical components. The 
power supply for the cooling system is only a subsystem of 
the Fukushima power plant, but its failure collapsed the entire 
system and was fatal. Event tree analysis, network analysis, 
and systems engineering will be necessary for understanding 
this issue. 
Note
i NHK, March 17, 04:01 am. Evacuees by prefecture: Miyagi- 205,418, 
Fukushima- 64,040, Iwate- 44,433, Yamagata- 2217, Aomori- 371, 
Akita- 40, Ibaraki- 12,347, Chiba- 1010, Tochigi- 1696, Gunma- 63, 
Saitama- 107, Niigata- 3200, Nagano- 1579.
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